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Among the key rationales typically invoked to support a system of medical malpractice law is the notion that fear over medical liability may incentivize a physician to provide a level of quality that she would not have otherwise provided absent the law. Scholarship to date, however, has provided surprisingly little evidence to support the existence of any such "deterrence" effect. Rather, the empirical malpractice literature has somewhat deemphasized considerations of medical quality and medical errors and has paid significantly more attention to the relationship between malpractice pressure and measures of health care utilization and costs.
The findings from this cost-focused literature, however, are simply not dispositive as to the question of whether malpractice law serves as an effective deterrent (in the proper sense of the word). In order to fully understand whether the U.S. medical malpractice system is achieving one of its stated, fundamental goals, it is paramount that malpractice researchers give independent evaluation to issues of health care quality.
Related to the question of whether malpractice law deters is the question of whether the threat of medical liability induces physicians to act "defensively." To be sure, these are not synonymous concepts. While deterrence is meant to identify situations in which liability causes physicians to behave optimally, defensive medicine is meant to capture the opposite. That is, defensive medicine can be seen as deterrence gone awry, whereby liability fears cause physicians to provide sub-or supra-optimal levels of care, with the emphasis often placed on the latter.
Those cost-focused studies alluded to above are largely concerned with probing the existence and scope of defensive practices. However, to properly label a response as defensive requires more than a mere understanding of whether liability encourages additional utilization of medical care. Since a defensive response is defined with reference to an "optimal" level of treatment, this assessment requires a determination as to whether or not any malpractice-induced expansion in treatment is accompanied by corresponding improvements in quality or outcomes.
As such, whether the goal is to make an independent evaluation of the deterrent impact of medical liability or to distinguish between a deterrent and a defensive response to liability, it is necessary to estimate the impact of the malpractice system on medical errors and healthcare quality. Evidence shows that medical errors continue to occur at potentially startling rates and that prevailing indicators of quality are at undesirable levels, indirectly suggesting that liability forces have not driven medical quality to its ideal levels. However, it is unclear how much worse the state of affairs would have been absent the present system of medical liability.
While the results are somewhat mixed, the literature has generally failed to provide systematic support for any contention that the existing medical liability system is effective in improving health care quality. Further research, of course, is needed on this fundamental question, though such research is confounded by a number of methodological difficulties, including (1) the need to capture outcome variables that are more highly reflective of the quality of healthcare received, as opposed to being more highly reflective of social, environmental and other determinants of health and (2) the need to capture enough variation in the structure or scope of the liability system, in order to tease out its relationship with medical outcomes.
In this paper, I estimate the relationship between medical liability and health care quality using a data source -i.e., the National Hospital Discharge Survey (NHDS) -that is well suited to confront these two methodological difficulties. First, the data covers a long enough period of time -i.e., 1979 to 2005 -and a broad enough span of jurisdictions to capture a rich source of variation in relevant malpractice and tort laws. Moreover, the NHDS records accommodate construction of broad-based metrics promoted by the associated medical literature (and by various agencies) as being indicative of the quality of care received during a medical encounter itself. For these latter purposes, I consider two fundamental domains of health care quality emphasized by the Agency for Healthcare Research and Quality: (1) avoidable hospitalizations, reflecting the level of care provided by the associated outpatient environment and (2) inpatient mortality rates for selected medical conditions (e.g., acute myocardial infarctions, hip fractures and strokes, among others), reflecting the level of care provided in inpatient care.
The results of this empirical exercise generally cast doubt upon the role that current medical liability rules play in inducing the provision of quality medical care. For instance, the estimated relationship between avoidable hospitalization rates and malpractice pressure, as identified by the adoption of non-economic damage caps and related tort reforms, is both statistically insignificant and small in magnitude, with a 95% confidence interval that is relatively tightly bound around zero. At one end of this interval, the lack of a non-economic damages cap (which is indicative of higher malpractice pressure) is associated with only a 4% decrease in avoidable hospitalizations. That is, at the most, the evidence implies an arguably modest degree of deterrence (with respect to outpatient care). I derive similar findings in exploring the impact of liability pressure on inpatient mortality rates for select conditions.
In my primary empirical approach, I investigate the malpractice-quality link by exploring the impact of legal reforms, such as damage caps, that arguably blunt the impact of the liability system without effectively changing its structure. As an alternative approach, following Frakes (2012a), I consider the impact of a more structural reform -i.e., the shift from a local-to a national-standard rule -that modifies the manner in which standards of care are determined in medical malpractice actions and that potentially alters the law's expectations as to how physicians should conduct their clinical practices. The results from this alternative approach are likewise small and statistically insignificant, suggesting, at most, a relatively modest impact of such reforms (in the predicted direction) on the geographical patterns of avoidable hospitalization rates and inpatient mortality rates for selected medical conditions. These results complement the small findings from the damages cap analysis in further demonstrating a weak connection between the law, as currently applied, and observed patterns of healthcare quality.
The paper proceeds as follows. In Section I, I discuss the indirect and direct sources of evidence that have been offered to date regarding the deterrent impact of medical liability.
Section I likewise presents a simple model of physician decisionmaking and discusses the various sources of ambiguity that cloud the channel of deterrence intended to be created by the malpractice system. Section II discusses the data and empirical methodology. Section III presents the results of the empirical deterrence analysis. Finally, Section IV concludes.
I. Malpractice Law and Physician Behavior: Background

A. Indirect evidence of deterrence: ongoing medical errors
To explore the role of the current liability system in incentivizing higher quality care, it is reported by several studies that found that between 2.9 and 3.7 percent of hospitalizations resulted in an adverse event and that between 6.6 and 13.6 percent of those adverse events led to death. These results suggest that as many as 44,000 to 98,000 Americans die each year as a result of medical errors, surpassing the number of Americans that die annually in motor vehicle accidents. Considering the report's focus on inpatient care and on mortality-related outcomes, the full extent of the harm caused by medical errors may be even greater.
The 2000 IOM Report ushered in a wave of policy initiatives and academic studies focused on healthcare quality, as distinct from costs and utilization patterns. Consistent with the implications of the 2000 IOM Report, the subsequent literature painted a rather bleak picture of the quality of care being delivered within the U.S. healthcare system. For instance, reviewing the medical records of a random sample of U.S. adults and evaluating healthcare performance across a range of quality indicators and clinical contexts, McGlynn et al. (2003) find that Americans may only be receiving roughly 50% of recommended care.
1 Assessing delivery quality across U.S. medical providers is, of course, complicated by the substantial uncertainties surrounding medical care. In many circumstances, there may be little consensus regarding the practices that physicians should be following, confounding any ability to form quality metrics to evaluate in the first place. The quality adherence studies indicated above are particularly troubling in so far as they demonstrate rampant misuse of care even in those arguably limited circumstances in which best practices have been identified by the experts. In any event, with respect to those remaining circumstances, the existence of substantial medical uncertainties themselves casts its own form of doubt upon the state of the current healthcare environment. A substantial body of literature in health economics and medicine has documented striking regional variations in the care provided by physicians, 2 the cause of which many have attributed, in part, to "practice-style" variations, whereby physicians in different regions develop divergent attitudes and beliefs regarding healthcare delivery practices (Wennberg 1984) . With beliefs diverging so remarkably, some have argued that the practice of medicine has veered far from the scientific ideal of a "single right way of doing things" (Blumstein 2002 ).
All told, the evidence presented by these quality-focused studies suggests that the medical malpractice system, if it is doing any work at all to incentive quality medicine, is falling short of its promise. Of course, what we cannot see from these indirect sources of evidence is 1 In evaluating quality, the McGlynn et al. (2003) study focused on assessing whether the care delivered to study participants adhered to recommended medical processes as identified by the RAND Quality Assessment Tool system (which, in turn, is based on various established national guidelines and on the relevant medical literature). 2 See, for example, Wennberg and Cooper (1999) .
the counterfactual. That is, how much worse off would the present state of affairs be absent the existing set of malpractice laws? In subsection D below, I discuss those studies that have explored this counterfactual more directly. However, I first confront another important background inquiry and discuss the empirical evidence that has been put forth regarding the general plausibility of the malpractice deterrence channel. To facilitate that analysis, I begin by introducing a simple model of physician decisionmaking in the shadow of liability.
B. Model of physician decisionmaking
The determinants of physician behavior are varied and complex in nature. Given the possible sensitivity of physicians to fears over malpractice liability, it is reasonable to suspect that one such determinant is the standard of care clinically expected of physicians under the law.
Consider a physician faced with the decision of whether or not to undertake a precaution / quality-improving action, A, that comes at a cost of C. Assume that patients present themselves with a complication level, s, where higher levels of s reflect more severe case mixes and where s follows a uniform distribution across the population. The increase in the quality of care delivered to a patient with complication level, s, arising from the taking of action A is equal to
B(s).
Assume that this benefit to the patient is increasing in s and at an increasing rate -that is, B s > 0 and B ss > 0. This latter condition implies diminishing benefits to taking greater precautions as physicians face patients with more and more favorable risk profiles (i.e., lower s).
Under an optimal liability rule following the spirit of the Learned Hand Formula, 3 the physician would be held liable for failing to take this precaution so long as the benefit from taking the precaution, B(s), exceeds the cost, C. Accordingly, the law will not expect the physician to maximize the total level of quality. Rather, it will only expect physicians to undertake cost-justified actions -that is, to act in the face of patients with s > s*, where s* is such that B(s*) = C. Physicians who fail to take this precaution in the case of such high-risk patients will be subject to liability for the expected damages sustained -i.e., the forgone benefits,
Since, B(s) is necessarily greater than C throughout the range in which this liability standard expects that the precaution be taken, a level of damages at B(s) will ensure that physicians exposed to this potential liability take the indicated precaution.
The private benefit to the physician for otherwise undertaking the precaution is equal to M(s), which is initially assumed to be less than the benefit to the patient, B(s), for all s. Thus, without liability rules, the physician will undertake precautions for all patients with s > s**, where s** is such that M(s**) = C. Since M(s) is less than B(s), it will intersect with C at a point, s**, that is greater than s*. Accordingly, with no liability, the physician will take fewer overall precautions over the full set of patients and deliver an overall lower level of quality, relative to a situation in which the physician is exposed to potential liability for failing to comply with the above standard. In the analysis below, I test this prediction and explore whether the threat of greater malpractice liability leads physicians to deliver a higher average level of quality.
A positive association of this nature would be consistent with a deterrent effect of medical malpractice law. Of course, it is possible that liability pressure may go too far and cause physicians to form a cutoff at a point lower than optimum, s*, leading to greater precaution taking. Often termed "defensive medicine," this latter scenario may arise due to the liability standard itself being set below this optimum cut-off or due to a physician's uncertainty regarding the location of the liability standard.
4
In practice, it is difficult to determine whether any observed increase in quality arising from greater liability pressure is reflective of a move in the direction of the optimum, s* (i.e., deterrence), or a move away from the optimum (i.e., defensive medicine). Of course, the returns to taking additional precautions diminish as physicians act in the face of patients with lower and lower risk profiles, s. As such, an observation of substantial increases in quality as precaution taking rises is perhaps more likely to be consistent with an intended deterrence impact than it is with a wasteful defensive medicine effect.
This framework conceives of a relatively broad range of actions/precautions, including the adoption of a quality-improving process (e.g., routine hemoglobin A1c testing for diabetes management), the exercise of additional care during a procedure or the undertaking of a procedure itself.
5
Much of the malpractice literature has focused on estimating the impact of 4 A physician uncertain regarding the location of s* may desire to err on the side of providing too many precautions (i.e., setting a complication cut-off less than s*) considering that the net harm from doing so (i.e., the degree to which precaution costs exceed the benefits derived) is less than the net harm from erring too far in the opposite direction (i.e., the degree to which the forgone benefits exceed the precaution costs). This asymmetry arises from the fact that the absolute difference between B(s) and C is generally larger to the right of s*, considering that B ss > 0. 5 In the situation where A represents a procedure which carries various risks in its execution, the costs of the action, C, will accordingly capture both the direct costs of the procedure and its associated risks. In this instance, it may not be the case that an increase in utilization of A leads 1-for-1 to an increase in quality. by a negligent medical error actually pursue a malpractice claim in the first place (Localio et al. 1991 ).
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That is, while the damages to be imposed for failure to take the expected precaution in the above model are B(s), the physician may only assign a small fraction, α, of this amount in weighing the costs and benefits of the proposed action. In this instance, the threat of liability may only induce the physician to take precautions for those levels of s beyond s^, where s^ is as such that αB(s^) = C. If the physician will already be inclined to provide the precaution at this level -i.e., , if the physician's provide benefit, M(s) exceeds α B(s) -then, the threat of malpractice liability will not alter the clinical decisionmaking of the physician.
Potentially confounding this deterrent channel even further is the possibility of an ineffective targeting of damage awards towards meritorious claims. To the extent that juries extend liability to situations in which physicians, in fact, did not negligently harm patients (i.e., where either the physician did indeed undertake the required precaution, A, or where the 6 In some instances, this knowledge may come through word-of-mouth among physicians following the outcomes of relevant malpractice proceedings or it may come through communications with their insurance providers. However, it is unclear whether this information comes at a level fine enough to influence clinical decisions. 7 When negligently harmed patients do file claims, the evidence suggests that the expected damage awards are considerable (Studdert et al. 2006 In a more recent study, however, Studdert et al. (2006) find that over 70 percent of non-meritorious claims (i.e., those involving neither negligence nor injuries) received no compensation, while over 70 percent of those claims that involved both injury and negligence did. Moreover, when non-meritorious claims did receive payment, those payments were substantially lower than those extended to meritorious claims (roughly $313,000 vs. $521,000). These findings instill some hope that the system may be sending the proper signals to physicians, though the targeting remains far from perfect.
However, even when those harmed by a negligent error are successful in seeking compensation, physicians may face limited immediate financial risk from the associated damage awards considering that they are insured against such losses and that such coverage is typically not experience rated (Currie and MacLeod 2008) . Moreover, claim amounts themselves rarely exceed malpractice insurance limits (Zeiler et al. 2007 Physicians may likewise endeavor to maximize the quality of care that they provide in order to be in compliance with certain professional obligations and in consideration of their affirmations to "do no harm" pursuant to the Hippocratic Oath. Physicians may even be incentivized by the promise of higher fees to provide a greater number of medical services, which may, in some circumstances at least, correspond to improvements in healthcare quality.
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To the extent that M(s) equals or exceeds B(s) (or to the extent that s** is lower than s*), liability standards will pose no incremental contribution to the levels of precaution undertaken by physicians.
All told, a heavy cloud of uncertainty engulfs this deterrence inquiry, necessitating empirical evaluation. A recent study by Frakes (2012a) provides empirical evidence that the abandonment of malpractice "locality rules" (which require that physicians comply with local customs) and contemporaneous adoptions of rules requiring physicians to follow national standards are associated with a striking amount of convergence in regional practice patterns.
This finding arguably sheds light on the general empirical relevancy of malpractice standards of care and suggests that physicians may indeed be aware of and responsive to the standards expected of them under the law.
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The results presented in Frakes (2012a) are encouraging in so far as they instill faith in the potential for malpractice law to deter undesirable behaviors.
However, Frakes' analysis was only designed to test for a physician response to a change in liability standards. It did not comprehensively explore whether the system as a whole is presently delivering benefits in terms of improved safety and quality. After all, even if standards of care have "bite" under the law and encourage the maintenance of those standards, quality medical care may only be incentivized to the extent that those standards are properly determined in the first place.
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As such, again, it is necessary to engage in a more direct investigation into the malpractice-quality relationship.
D. Direct evidence of deterrence
Relatively limited evidence has been put forth to date regarding the degree to which medical malpractice deters undesirable practices.
14 Whatever has been done has largely been conducted in connection with investigations into the presence of defensive medicine or into the supply-related impacts of malpractice law. Thus far, the evidence offered on the impact of malpractice law on health status and health care quality has painted a rather inconsistent picture.
Some studies hitting upon this deterrence question estimate the association between liability pressure and a health outcome statistic that is experienced by the broader population affected by the liability regime -i.e., not simply those patients accessing the health care system in particular ways. For instance, Lakdawalla and Seabury (2009) generally finding no evidence consistent with any such relationship.
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One limitation of the above approaches is that such broad-based health outcome measures are likely to be driven by many factors other than the quality of care actually delivered at 13 Indeed, considering that standards of care are largely determined based on customary practices (and not as a part of an abstract evaluation of whether the benefits of the actions taken justify the costs) and considering the many forces in play that may cause customary practices to deviate from optimality (e.g., physician induced demand), there may be many reasons to doubt that customary practices generate an optimal standard. The discouraging evidence regarding delivery quality in the U.S. presented in subsection A above lends further support to the contention that standards of care based on customary practices may not pose the proper quality-inducing incentives upon physicians.
14 For a general review of the evidence bearing on deterrence (up to 2002), see Mello and Brennan (2002) . 15 See, for example, Casey et al. (2001) . 16 Various other studies similarly calculate health outcome measures based on mortality rates that are focused on more targeted populations. For instance, Kessler and McClellan (1996) estimate a trivial relationship between liability reforms and (1) survival rates during the one year period following treatment for a serious cardiac event (e.g., acute myocardial infarction), and (2) hospital readmission rates for repeated serious cardiac events over that period. Sloan and Shadle (2009) Apgar scores and infant mortality rates are arguably more connected to a particular encounteri.e., the delivery itself. However, delivery outcomes are significantly shaped by environmental, physical and medical factors throughout the full term of the pregnancy and not simply the delivery. While outcomes such as general mortality rates and infant mortality rates are unquestionably important, the possibility of a multitude of determinants of one's health status raises concerns over the ability to reliably identify the link between variations in the malpractice environment and the indicated health outcomes. Another limitation of these mortality-focused outcomes is, of course, that they omit a broader range of morbidity-related considerations.
A key advantage of focusing the malpractice inquiry on those measures emphasized by the health quality literature and by the AHRQ and related agencies is that the promoted measures are, by their very design, better reflective of the influence of the delivered health care itself.
While some of these measures -e.g., avoidable hospitalization rates -may not necessarily capture our final outcomes of interest, they nonetheless represent intermediate measures that are linked to those undesirable outcomes and that at least avoid some of the statistical difficulties identified above, given their tighter connection with the healthcare provision process. Moreover, intermediate outcomes of this nature also offer the benefit of bearing upon a broader range of negative outcomes, beyond just those focused on mortality.
Very few malpractice studies have investigated the link between malpractice law and the type of quality metrics emphasized by the medical literature and by agencies such as the AHRQ.
In one recent study, Greenberg et al. (2010) document a positive association between adverse events incurred during hospitalizations (measured according to the AHRQ's Patient Safety Indicators) and subsequent claiming of malpractice. However, rather than exploring the way in which liability pressure may lead ex ante to improved patient safety -i.e., deterrence -they instead focus on studying how improvements in patient safety (perhaps arising from a range of initiatives) can alleviate ex post liability exposure for providers. One study that perhaps most directly explores the impact of liability pressure on a relevant set of quality metrics is Currie and MacLeod (2008) . The authors find that damage cap adoptions increase preventable complications of labor and delivery (a measure in the spirit of the AHRQ's Patient Safety Indicators), suggesting that higher liability pressure improves patient safety.
The analysis below builds upon the Currie and MacLeod (2008) study in several important ways. First, it expands beyond the obstetric context to explore additional domains of health care quality, including one focused on the quality of care delivered at the outpatient level.
Despite the fact that outpatient healthcare has come to represent over 20% of the nation's total healthcare dollars and represents one of the fastest growing components of U.S. healthcare spending (CMS 2011), this aspect of healthcare delivery has, to my knowledge, received no specific attention by the malpractice deterrence literature. As explained further in Section II, the analysis below also captures a richer degree of variation in relevant tort laws than that considered by Currie and MacLeod, resulting in arguably more reliable estimates. Moreover, as an alternative way to investigate the link between liability and quality, I also consider the impact of more structural liability reforms, which alter the clinical standards expected of physicians.
II. Data and Methodology
A. Overview
I collect data on healthcare quality from the 1979 to 2005 National Hospital Discharge Surveys (NHDS), each of which provides a nationally-representative sample of inpatient discharge records from short-stay, non-federal hospitals. Additional details regarding the NHDS are provided in the Appendix. Using the relevant diagnosis codes provided by the NHDS, I
calculate, for each state and year, mean levels of various healthcare quality metrics (discussed further below). I then take two approaches in evaluating the impact of malpractice law on healthcare quality: (1) one approach exploring the effects of fluctuations in the general level of pressure imposed by the malpractice system (identified by damage caps and related reforms), effectively taking as given the structure of that system and (2) another approach exploring the effects of more structural reforms, which alter the manner in which courts determine medical liability standards, effectively taking as given the level of pressure imposed by the system.
B. Malpractice Pressure / Damage Cap Analysis
I begin this deterrence analysis by estimating the relationship between the relevant quality measures and the prevailing level of malpractice pressure associated with the given state and year. Consistent with much of the malpractice literature, I identify variations in malpractice pressure using adoptions of certain tort reforms, the immediate effect of which is largely to reduce the expected levels of damages imposed in the event of liability. This effect, in turn, may leave plaintiffs and/or their attorneys less inclined to bring suit, thereby lessening the level of pressure placed upon physicians. Though generally fully insured, physicians may welcome such reduced likelihoods of suit to the extent that they face non-pecuniary costs of liability. The reforms that I emphasize in this analysis, and that have received the most attention by the literature, are caps on non-economic damage awards (i.e., pain and suffering awards). Twenty-eight states currently have non-economic damage cap provisions in place, most of which were adopted during the malpractice crisis of the 1980's.
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In light of the timing of this variation, those studies relying on post-1980s data to evaluate the impact of non-economic damage caps (e.g., Currie and MacLeod 2008) fail to draw on the most relevant sources of variation in malpractice law and consequently rely on few 17 A large body of related literature has explored the relationship between tort reforms and various outcomes of the malpractice marketplace: claims frequency, claims severity, insurance premiums, and physician location. See Mello (2006) for an extensive review of this literature. These studies suggest that non-economic damage caps are perhaps the most relevant and most influential tort reform measures (Mello 2006 Frakes (2012b) , I also classify states as having non-economic damages provisions if they have laws that place caps on total damages awards. Such laws, after all, necessarily cap non-economic damages as well. In light of the imposition of state fixed effects, this classification only has relevance in the context of 1 state (Texas) that adopted a total damages cap at a time when it did not have a specific non-economic damage cap in place. Only 1 additional state -i.e., Colorado -adopted a total damages cap over the sample period (2 years following the adoption of a non-economic damages cap). With this in mind, I do not separately control for the incidence of a cap on total damages. However, I estimate nearly identical results for the remaining coefficients when I do include this additional covariate and treat total and non-economic damage caps separately. treatment groups. Limited variation of this nature implicates concerns over the reliability of the estimated standard errors and over the consistency of the point estimates -that is, with few treatment groups, it is less likely that spurious correlations between the outcome variable and the reforms of interest will average to zero (Frakes 2012; Conley and Taber 2011) . The NHDS data, supplemented with geographic identifier codes, provides inpatient discharge records from a broad enough span of states and covering a long enough period of time to allow for a deterrence analysis that draws on an extensive set of legislative variations.
[INSERT TABLE 1 ABOUT HERE] Table 1 lists those states that modified their non-economic damage cap laws over the NHDS sample period. In most specifications, I also explore the association between observed healthcare quality and certain additional types of tort reforms, including reforms of the collateral source rule, caps on punitive-damages awards and other "indirect" tort reforms. Traditional collateral source rules generally prohibited defendants from introducing evidence of compensatory payments made to plaintiffs from outside sources (e.g., insurers). Thirty-three states currently have laws in place that eliminate this traditional rule, effectively reducing the scope of compensatory damage awards (see Table 2 for variations in these rules over time).
Much of these reforms likewise occurred during the mid-1980s; however, there are a substantial amount of independent reforms of each type, facilitating identification of their separate impacts.
[
INSERT TABLE 2 ABOUT HERE]
Punitive damages are awarded on a much rarer basis in malpractice actions than are noneconomic damages awards (without a correspondingly large increase in average payouts).
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Thus, relative to non-economic damages, it is arguable that the threat of liability for punitive damages will have a weaker impact on physician behavior. Nonetheless, despite the infrequent application of such awards, considering that punitive damages are generally not insured by liability carriers, it remains reasonable to believe that physicians may be sensitive to the threat posed by punitive awards (Malani and Reif 2012) . Finally, following the classification of malpractice reforms introduced by Kessler and McClellan (1996) , I estimate the general impact associated with a residual reform category (labeled "indirect" reforms) that includes contingency fee limitations, requirements of periodic payment of future damages, joint and several liability reforms, and provisions for a patients' compensation fund.
21
C. Liability-Standards Analysis
Traditional malpractice law set operable standards of care by turning to the customary behavior of physicians practicing in the same locality as the defendant, essentially expecting that physicians follow the practices applied by those around them. Since the 1960s and 1970s, the majority of states have amended their substantive malpractice laws to abandon such locality rules in favor of rules requiring physicians to follow national standards of care. In light of the rampant regional disparities in care that persist across regions (see, for example, Wennberg and Cooper 1999) , one can view the move from a local to a national-standard rule as a meaningful alteration of the standards clinically expected of physicians (Frakes 2012a) .
Accordingly, as an alternative approach to exploring the relationship between malpractice law and healthcare quality, I explore whether this modification of the standards expected of physicians results in a corresponding change in observed quality measures. While this investigation may not be able to compare the present state of affairs to a counterfactual in which liability rules place no expectations upon physicians, it nonetheless provides insight into whether the system and its standard-setting process is at least capable of impacting prevailing measures of health quality -i.e., that healthcare quality is sensitive to this policy lever.
[ INSERT TABLE 3 ABOUT HERE] Frakes (2012a) tests the hypothesis that, upon the adoption of a national-standard rule, physician practices in the affected regions will converge towards the practices of the rest of the nation, focusing on utilization rates of various obstetric and cardiac treatments and diagnostic procedures. In this analysis, I follow Frakes (2012) and test for the impact of national-standard adoptions by estimating whether mean quality measures in a state that uses a local-standard rule converge towards the relevant national means when the state amends its malpractice laws to require that physicians comply with national standards of care. 
D. Quality measures
The acknowledgement that providers are falling short on quality has propelled initiatives designed to fill this gap (e.g., hospital report cards), along with the associated development of Avoidable hospitalizations. The first quality measure that I employ captures the rate of avoidable hospitalizations (AH) within each state-year cell, a measure that is inspired by the AHRQ's PQIs. Though constructed using inpatient data, AH rates are meant to reflect the quality of care prevailing in the associated outpatient / ambulatory community. Such measures identify conditions (e.g., asthma, diabetes, malignant hypertension, etc.) with respect to which proper outpatient care would have prevented the need for hospitalization.
To calculate avoidable hospitalization rates, I first count the number of hospitalizations within the NHDS records for each state-year cell in which a diagnosis is indicated for any of the relevant conditions. In the preferred specification, I count hospitalizations in which the conditions are identified in the primary diagnosis code only. To form the relevant rate, it is of course necessary to normalize these AH counts in some manner. Following Frakes (2012a) , I
elect to use measures internal to the NHDS records to form the relevant denominator. The three alternative denominators that I employ, each calculated at the state-year level, are as follows: (1) an index of hospitalizations equal to the count of admissions associated with any of the following conditions and events: acute myocardial infarction, stroke, gastro-intestinal bleeding or hip fracture (i.e., the "low-variations" health index), (2) the number of hospitalizations associated with the delivery of a child, and (3) the number of acute myocardial infarction discharges. More details regarding the rationalization behind these choices are provided in the Appendix.
Primarily, these normalization approaches allow for a scaling of the AH count by a measure reflective of the size of the associated state-year sample, while also offering a denominator that is itself not likely to be significantly impacted by the prevailing malpractice environment (Frakes 2012a ).
Inpatient mortality for selected conditions. Following the AHRQ's IQIs, I next construct a measure indicative of inpatient quality, whereby I calculate the composite rate of inpatient mortality among a sub-sample of discharges in which the primary diagnosis code indicates certain medical conditions (e.g., acute myocardial infarction, stroke, etc.). The indicated conditions are both high-volume in occurrence and, for the most part, reflective of lowdiscretionary hospitalizations, in which case mortality rates among this sub-sample can be seen as more likely reflective of the quality of care observed during the inpatient stay itself, rather than as a result of risk selection. In the Appendix, I likewise provide more details regarding the construction of this composite inpatient mortality rate, including a discussion of the various ways in which I account for the potentially confounding influence of fluctuations in the proportions of the conditions comprising this sub-sample (for instance, an increase in the proportional incidence of hip fractures, which is a relatively low mortality condition among this sample, could result in a reduction in the observed mortality rate with no actual improvement in quality). In the preferred specification, I risk adjust mortality rates for these respective incidences.
INSERT TABLE 4 ABOUT HERE]
Descriptive statistics. Means and standard deviations for the key health care quality and legal variables are provided in Table 4 . On average, each state-year cell contains roughly 1017 avoidable hospitalizations, which represents roughly 0.8 avoidable hospitalizations (based on primary discharge codes) for each discharge associated with the delivery of a child (or a rate of 1.7 for the case of AH rates based on any diagnosis code) and on average 1.7 avoidable hospitalizations (based on primary discharge codes) for each discharge in which the patient presents with either acute myocardial infarction, stroke, hip fracture, or gastro-intestinal bleeding (or a rate of 3.5 for the case of AH rates based on any diagnosis code). On average, each NHDS state-year cell contains roughly 424 discharges associated with the selected conditions comprising the sub-sample used in the second quality measure considered -that is, the composite inpatient mortality rate. The average inpatient mortality rate among this sub-sample is 8 percent.
E. Specifications
With respect to each of the above health care quality measures, I first test for evidence of malpractice-induced deterrence by estimating the following basic difference-in-difference specification:
(1) To explore whether prevailing health care quality is responsive to a change in standards expected of physicians under the law (i.e., an alternative approach to exploring the malpracticequality link), I explore whether state mean rates for the relevant quality measures converge towards their respective national mean rates as states adopt national-standard rules. For these purposes, following Frakes (2012) , I estimate the following specification:
where X s,t , Z s,t , O s,t , γ s , λ t and φ s,t are defined as above. NS s,t represents an indicator for a national-standard law. Representing a measure of closeness between state and national quality 23 I form the incidences of the relevant demographic variables using the NHDS sample itself, though the results are entirely robust to alternative state-year controls based off of the Census data. Following Frakes (2012a) , in the primary specifications, I form the relevant incidences using the sample of discharges in which patients present themselves for acute myocardial infarction, stroke, gastro-intestinal bleeding or hip fracture. This sub-sample consists of patients that will almost universally seek hospitalization upon the occurrence of the event, in which case the sample itself is generally not sensitive to the prevailing legal environment. In any event, the results of this exercise are also robust to the formation of the demographic covariates using the entire sample of state-year NHDS discharges. 24 HMO penetration rates are from Interstudy Publications. Household income data is from the decennial Census files and the American Community Surveys. Data on physician population counts are from the American Medical Association (AMA) administrative records and were obtained from the Area Resource File. 25 Frakes (2012a) documents a relationship between the adoption of laws requiring physicians to follow national (as opposed to local) standards and a resulting convergence in physician practices across regions. In light of the fact that two of the damage-cap treatment states used in the defensive-medicine analysis below (Hawaii and Texas) were dropped from the specifications estimated in Frakes (2012a) (due to an inability to classify the full history of their standard-of-care laws), I exclude controls for national-standard laws in the damage-cap specifications estimated below and focus instead on the traditional tort reform measures. However, the results presented below are robust to the inclusion of controls for national-standard laws (not shown). measures, Q_GAP s,t , is calculated as the absolute value of the difference between the state and national quality measure, normalized by the national measure.
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The coefficient of interest is represented by 1 , identifying the extent to which the adoption of a national-standard law is associated with a convergence between state and national quality. Of course, the above-specified dependent variable may also capture sources of mean revision in regional quality, posing a concern that 1 spuriously reflects a differential level of mean revision between treatment and control states. I address this concern through a falsification exercise in which I include a "lead" of the national-standard indicator, NS s,t+2 , in the base specifications, where this variable indicates, at time t, a state's national-standard status at time t+2. A negative estimate for 2 would suggest that the convergence associated with such laws emerged in the period leading up to their adoptions and thus may not be reflective of a true policy response.
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While this concern is especially paramount in the regional convergence analysis, I likewise include lead coefficients for the damage cap variables in some of the estimations of specifications (1) and (2) above.
III. Results
A. Avoidable Hospitalization Rates
I begin the deterrence analysis by exploring whether malpractice pressure induces physicians to deliver higher quality care at the outpatient or ambulatory level, where an increase in quality is represented by a decrease in avoidable hospitalizations (AH) and where an increase in pressure is identified by the non-incidence of a damages cap (and related reforms). Column 1 of Table 5 presents estimates of the basic difference-in-difference (DD) specification indicated in equation (1). I estimate that the adoption of a non-economic damages cap is associated with a roughly 0.3 percent increase in the AH rate (normalized by the low-variation health index and calculated using primary diagnosis codes only). This estimate is statistically indistinguishable from zero, though relatively tightly bound around zero.
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Even at the upper end of the 95 percent confidence interval, I find that the adoption of a non-economic damages cap is associated 26 In calculating this dependent variable for each state and year, the national rate is adjusted accordingly to remove the contribution of the NHDS records from the relevant state-year cell. 27 I follow Gruber and Hungerman (2008) in observing behavior in the 2-year period leading up to the reform, providing enough time to sufficiently assess pre-reform treatment rates. 28 Reported standard errors in Table 5 and in all subsequent tables are clustered at the state level to allow for arbitrary within-state correlations of the error structure.
with only a 4.9 percent increase in the AH rate. That is, at the most, the evidence suggests that malpractice pressure (as captured by the lack of a damages cap) leads to a modest level of deterrence of AHs, inconsistent with the notion that the medical liability system is a substantial driver of health care quality.
The point estimate of the non-economic damage cap coefficient falls and turns negative with the addition of other tort reforms and state-year covariates, as demonstrated by Column 2 of The estimated coefficients of the collateral source rule reform variable and the punitive damages cap variable are likewise small and statistically insignificant, with similarly sized confidence intervals around zero. The estimated coefficient of the residual reform categoryi.e., the "indirect" reform category specified according to Kessler and McClellan (1996) -is negative and bound away from zero in some specifications, counter to any expectation that such reforms would relax malpractice pressures to the detriment of patient quality.
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In each of the specifications estimated in Table 5 , I perform F-tests for the joint significance of the various malpractice reforms and fail to reject the hypothesis that the reforms are jointly equal to zero.
As demonstrated by The estimated damage cap coefficients turn more in the positive direction when normalizing AH counts by the number of deliveries (i.e., more in the direction indicative of deterrence), though the estimates remain small, statistically indistinguishable from zero, and relatively tightly bound around zero. Moreover, the estimated lead coefficient suggests that any such positive relationship may have materialized in the pre-adoption period.
31
Most of the above-estimated specifications include state-year controls for physician concentration rates. Such controls may absorb any impact of the reforms that occur through changes in the physician population. However, these simple controls may not absorb all supplyrelated consequences of such reforms. One effect of non-economic damage cap adoptions sometimes hypothesized is that lower-quality physicians may be attracted to the jurisdiction subsequent to the reform (Seabury 2010), a development which could otherwise confound any attempt to isolate the impact of malpractice pressure on the quality provided by any-given provider (arguably the emphasis of the deterrence analysis). Of course, to the extent that noneconomic damage caps would attract low-quality physicians and lead to a decline in observed quality measures -e.g., to an increase in AH rates -this omission could only help to explain 30 The analysis thus far has implicitly assumed that malpractice liability may only impact avoidable hospitalization rates through the influence of liability pressure on the quality of care delivered at the outpatient level. However, physicians may hold some degree of discretion over the decision to admit patients when presenting themselves at the hospital with the indicated conditions. Liability may influence this discretion in various ways. For instance, fearful over liability for failing to admit a patient, physicians may admit those marginal patients whom they may have otherwise decided did not warrant admission. A response of this nature could confound the above results by masking the presence of a true deterrent effect at the outpatient level. Of course, liability fears could also impact the inpatient admission decision in the opposite direction, whereby such fears induce hospitals and providers to avoid high risk patients (Mello et al. 2005) or to avoid some hospitalizations over liability fears stemming from the care to be administered during the hospital admission itself. As such, it is unclear what role liability fears may play at the admissions decision level. Further research is needed regarding this margin. In any event, the above analysis suggests that liability pressure does not appear to be a major determinant of those measures that the health care quality literature and the AHRQ have promoted as being indicative of the quality of care delivered at associated outpatient environments (using inpatient data). 31 Finally (not shown), these AH estimates persist under alternative specifications that use levels of AH rates, as opposed to logs.
some of the estimated positive effects of such reforms on AH rates. That is, a correction for this bias would likely push the estimated impacts of the reforms on AH rates even lower, only lending further support to the claim that liability pressure does not appear to be substantially improving the quality of care being delivered by physicians at the outpatient level.
The above approach identifies the influence of malpractice law by comparing quality across regimes marked by different levels of expected liability awards, effectively taking as given the structure of the liability system itself. In an alternative approach to exploring the link between malpractice and health care quality, I estimate the specification indicated by equation (3) above and explore whether observed quality metrics are influenced by reforms that alter the clinical standards of care expected of physicians. I present the results of this alternative approach in Table 8 . Upon the abandonment of a local standard rule and the contemporaneous adoption of a national standard rule (which should reflect a change in the expectations being placed upon physicians considering the significant variations in care delivered across regions), I
estimate a roughly 1 -1.7 percentage-point increase in the percentage absolute deviation between state and national AH rates. The direction of this estimate is inconsistent with the hypothesized impact of national-standard rules, which would be expected to lead to a convergence (not a divergence) in regional quality measures. As such, the direction of this estimate is likewise inconsistent with the notion that healthcare quality measures are responsive to the clinical standards expected of physicians under the law.
Of course, the 95 percent confidence interval for this estimate bounds zero and thus cannot rule out a convergence impact of national-standard rules (which would otherwise suggest that health care quality outcomes are sensitive to medical liability rules). However, the confidence interval itself is, all things considered, relatively small. The bottom end of this interval suggests an impact of national-standard adoptions in which the gap between state and national avoidable hospitalization rates is closed by 2.7 percentage points, or by roughly 19.5 percent. Thus, at the most, the estimates suggest a convergence impact of national-standard adoptions on health care quality that is less than half of the size of the mean estimated convergence in treatment and diagnostic utilization measures documented in Frakes (2012a). Table 7 presents estimation results from specifications that explore the relationship between non-economic damage caps (and related reforms) and the composite inpatient mortality rate for selected conditions (following the AHRQ's Inpatient Quality Indicators measure). The pattern of results is very similar to those presented in Tables 5 and 6 for the case of avoidable hospitalizations. Each specification estimates a small association between non-economic damage cap adoptions and the relevant inpatient mortality rate. In the basic DD specification without any state-year controls, I estimate that non-economic damage cap adoptions are associated with a 0.8 percent increase in the indicated mortality rate. I find that this estimate falls to a -3.8 percent decrease in such rates upon the addition of various state-year controls and state-specific linear time trends, suggesting that higher liability pressure (as identified by the lack a damages cap) may actually lead to higher mortality rates and thus lesser quality, counter to the deterrence hypothesis.
B. Inpatient Mortality Rates for Selected Conditions
INSERT TABLE 7 ABOUT HERE]
The estimated coefficients of the non-economic damage cap variable in Table 7 are statistically indistinguishable from zero and cannot rule out some amount of malpractice-induced deterrence -that is, some amount of reduction in mortality rates associated with higher liability pressure. However, as with the AH rates results, the estimated confidence intervals are relatively small. Based on the specification with state-year controls and state-specific linear time trends, the upper end of the 95 percent confidence interval suggests that the adoption of a damages cap is associated with only a 2.4 percent increase in the composite inpatient mortality rate for the indicated conditions (or a 0.2 percentage-point increase in the relevant rate) -that is, at the most, a reduction (increase) in liability pressure is associated with only a minor decline (improvement)
in observed inpatient quality.
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32 The unit of observation in the specifications estimated above is a given state-year cell. In an alternative approach (not shown), I estimate linear probability models where the unit of observation is an individual discharge within the sample of inpatient admissions associated with the selected conditions (e.g., acute myocardial infarctions, strokes, etc.) and where the dependent variable is an indicator for inpatient mortality (in such models, I include controls for the incidence of the relevant conditions). The results from this alternative approach are (perhaps not surprisingly) nearly identical to those of the state-year specifications estimated in Table 7 .
The non-economic damages cap results generalize to the additional tort reforms, suggesting a generally weak relationship between inpatient quality and a broader range of reforms. Moreover, the results of an F-test of joint significance fail to reject the hypothesis that the coefficients of the various tort reforms are all jointly equal to zero.
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Roughly 35 state-year observations are dropped from the above specifications as a result of having no relevant mortalities in the associated state-year cell, in light of the logged dependent variable. However, as demonstrated by Columns 6 and 7 of Table 7 , I estimate essentially the same pattern of results when using non-logged mortality rates. Likewise, the estimates remain nearly unchanged when I use non-standardized mortality rates and address concerns over fluctuations in the various conditions comprising the relevant sub-sample for this mortality analysis by including separate covariates for the relative state-year incidences of the various conditions.
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In Panel B of Table 8 , I estimate the association between the adoption of nationalstandard rules and the percentage absolute deviation between state and national inpatient mortality rates for the selected conditions (risk adjusted). The estimated coefficient of the national-standard variable is again small and statistically indistinguishable from zero. Though insignificant, the point estimates suggest that national-standard rules are associated with 0.5 -2
percentage-point reduction in the percentage absolute deviation between the relevant state and national mortality rates, which is consistent with a convergence effect in which roughly 3 -12 percent of the gap between such state and national rates is closed upon the legal reform. The associated confidence intervals are slightly wider than those estimated in the AH rate specifications, where the bottom ends of the 95 percent confidence intervals estimated across the various specifications suggest a convergence effect in which 20 -40 percent of the state-national mortality gap is closed upon a national-standard adoption, an amount which is still less than the mean treatment and diagnostic convergence findings documented by Frakes (2012a) .
33 However, the p-value of the F-test in column 5 is substantially lower at 0.07; though, this result is perhaps largely driven by the negative estimate for the punitive damages cap coefficient, a result that is of a sign opposite that expected from a deterrent response. 34 The results are also nearly identical when estimating specifications that make no corrections for fluctuations in the relative incidences of the respective conditions. In other specifications (not shown), I estimate the relationship between liability reforms and the rate of hospitalization for each such condition, where this rate is calculated relative to the total number of hospitalizations within this sub-sample of selected conditions. The results suggest very little relationship, if any, between liability pressure and the distribution of conditions comprising this sub-sample. For instance, at the upper end of the 95 confidence interval, the adoption of a non-economic damages cap is associated with only a 0.7 percent increase in the relative rate of hip fracture admissions among this subsample and only a 3 percent increase in the relative rate of stroke admissions.
[ INSERT TABLE 8 ABOUT HERE] Moreover, though likewise statistically indistinguishable from zero, the point estimates for the coefficients of the national-standard lead indicator variables are also negative and of a magnitude greater than that associated with the contemporaneous indicators. This pre-period falsification exercise suggests that any convergence in quality arising from national-standard adoptions, even if present, may have materialized in the period leading up to the nationalstandard adoptions (which would be inconsistent with the expectation of a treatment effect). All told, there is little evidence to suggest that the geographic standardization of medical malpractice law is associated with a corresponding standardization of observed quality, implying that healthcare quality may not be so responsive to liability standards (as they are currently applied).
IV. Conclusion
The literature has shown that physicians' clinical practices may be responsive along some dimensions to the medical liability system, whether in showing that higher liability pressure is associated with greater diagnostic utilization (Baicker, Fischer and Chandra 2007) or in showing that regional obstetric and cardiac procedure rates change upon an alteration of the clinical standards expected of that region under malpractice law (Frakes 2012a) . However, these previous findings do not necessarily entail that the system is operating as intended -that is, to optimize the care delivered to patients and to encourage the maintenance of high quality practices. Physicians may respond to malpractice standards, but that liability channel may only lead to true deterrence of medical errors and low-quality practices so long as such liability standards are themselves designed to ensure such an outcome. Presently, the liability system largely defers to medical custom itself in determining the standards expected of physicians under the law (as opposed to a more abstract process of determining what is reasonable and appropriate care). As such, considering the general deficiencies of the present health care system in ensuring high quality delivery -that is, considering the deficiencies of customary practices (McGlynn et al. 2003 -it is perhaps reasonable to believe that the liability system, in turn, may be insufficiently designed to deliver the desired degree of deterrence.
Focusing on composite measures of health care quality in both inpatient and outpatient domains, the results presented above are indeed suggestive of a current malpractice system that does not substantially improve upon the quality of care delivered by medical providers. This finding, combined with the evidence offered to date regarding the remarkably low percentage of negligently injured patients who even pursue a malpractice claim in the first instance (Localio et al. 1991) , implies that malpractice law may be falling short in meeting two of its fundamental goals: deterring low-quality medicine and ensuring compensation for losses. However, considering that physicians may be responsive to malpractice law in a more general sense (and are thus not driven exclusively by non-legal influences), certain alterations of the liability system may lead it to better achieve these objectives.
Next generation malpractice reforms currently receiving much attention include those that provide more definitive liability safe harbors for physicians who follow specified clinical are weighted by the relevant denominator used in the state-year quality rate (e.g., the state-year delivery count or the state-year low-variation health index), except for the case of avoidable hospitalization counts, which are un-weighted. For illustrative purposes, I do not weight the tort variable statistics (though they are weighted in various ways in the different specifications, depending on the denominator used in the state-year quality rate). Source: National Hospital Discharge Survey (1979 Survey ( -2005 . Notes: robust standard errors corrected for within-state correlation in the error term are reported in parentheses. All regressions included state and year fixed effects and are weighted by the number of admissions (for the relevant state and year) in the subsample of discharges associated with the selected conditions (i.e., the sum of discharges for acute myocardial infarction, heart failure, acute stroke, gastrointestinal bleeding, hip fracture or pneumonia). Mortality rates in Columns 1-7 are risk-adjusted for the incidence (among the sub-sample) of each of the conditions comprising the sub-sample of selected conditions. Columns 8 and 9 use un-adjusted mortality rates, but include controls for each of these incidences. Source: 1979 -2005 National Hospital Discharge Surveys. *** Significant at the 1 percent level. ** Significant at the 5 percent level. * Significant at the 10 percent level. NO NO NO YES YES Notes: robust standard errors corrected for within-state correlation in the error term are reported in parentheses. All regressions included state and year fixed effects and are weighted by the low-variation health index (i.e., the sum of discharges for acute myocardial infarction, stroke, hip fracture or gastrointestinal bleeding) in Panel A or weighted by the number of hospitalizations in the selected conditions sub-sample (i.e., the sum of discharges for acute myocardial infarction, heart failure, acute stroke, gastrointestinal bleeding, hip fracture or pneumonia) in Panel B. Source: 1979 -2005 National Hospital Discharge Surveys. *** Significant at the 1 percent level. ** Significant at the 5 percent level. * Significant at the 10 percent level.
Appendix: Data Source and Quality Measures
National Hospital Discharge Survey
Healthcare quality data is collected from the National Hospital Discharge Survey (NHDS), a nationally-representative sample of inpatient discharge records from short-stay, non-federal hospitals. For approximately 260,000 inpatient records per year, the NHDS contains information on, among other things: (a) primary and secondary diagnosis and procedure codes, (b) certain demographic characteristics of the patient, and (c) certain characteristics of the hospital. I supplement the public NHDS files with geographic identifiers (restricted-use variables) received pursuant to an agreement with the Research Data Center at the National Center for Health Statistics (NCHS). The resulting sample covers the years 1979 to 2005.
Healthcare Quality Measures
For the purposes of the above study, I look to the AHRQ for guidance in selecting quality metrics. The AHRQ measures are particularly useful for the present study in so far as they are designed for use with administrative inpatient databases such as the NHDS. The AHRQ's quality indicators are classified into 4 modules: (1) Prevention Quality Indicators (PQIs), identifying admissions that could have been avoided through access to high-quality outpatient care, (2) Inpatient Quality Indicators (IQIs), reflecting the quality of care inside hospitals including inpatient mortality for certain medical conditions, (3) Patient Safety Indicators (PSIs), focusing on potentially avoidable complications during inpatient care and (4) Pediatric Quality Indicators, applying the other three modules to the case of children and neonates.
For the purposes of this analysis, I utilize quality metrics inspired by the first two modules: PQIs and IQIs. While the NHDS does sample a large number of hospitalizations for each state and year, it nonetheless may not provide enough power to explore the rather rare adverse events that comprise some of the PSIs, along with the quality of care delivered only to the child population. Moreover, the richness of the classification codes associated with the PSIs, in light of the need to track changes to these classifications over the entire 27-year period of the NHDS sample, complicates the ability to apply such indicators to the NHDS sample (further complicating this application are the lack of DRG codes in the NHDS records, which the ARHQ recommends using in construction their PSIs). The PQIs and IQIs, under proper modifications are more readily approachable using the NHDS records.
Avoidable hospitalizations. First, I calculate a rate of avoidable hospitalizations (AH) within each state-year cell, a measure inspired by the AHRQ's PQIs. AH rates, generally, and the PQIs, specifically, are measures that are constructed using inpatient data, though meant to reflect the quality of care prevailing in the associated outpatient / ambulatory community. Such measures identify conditions (e.g., asthma, diabetes, malignant hypertension, etc.) with respect to which proper outpatient care would have prevented the need for hospitalization. According to the AHRQ, their PQIs grew out of research in the early 1990s by Joel Weissman and colleagues.
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The Weissman et al. (1992) AH classification scheme is designed in slightly more general terms than the PQIs and thus arguably lends itself to easier codification using a set of NHDS records that span several decades (considering the complexity associated with tracking variations in ICD classifications over time).
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For this reason, and in light of the fact that Weismann et al. developed their classification during the middle of the period in which the NCHS sampled physicians to compile the NHDS (unlike the PQIs, which came later), I elect to construct an AH rate for this analysis using the Weissman et al. classification.
To calculate avoidable hospitalization rates for each state and year in the sample, I first count the number of hospitalizations within the NHDS records for that state-year cell in which a diagnosis is indicated for any of the conditions included in the Weissman et al. (1992) classification. I perform such counts under two alternative approaches: one in which the conditions are identified in any one of the indicated diagnosis codes and one in which the conditions are identified in the primary diagnosis code only. To form the relevant rate, it is of course necessary to normalize these AH counts in some manner. Following Frakes (2012a) , I elect to use measures internal to the NHDS records to form the relevant denominator for each state-year AH rate, taking several alternative approaches to this normalization.
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In one approach, for example, I normalize each AH count by the number of hospitalizations associated with the delivery of a child found in the NHDS records for the relevant state and year. This approach allows for a scaling of the AH count by a measure reflective of the size of the associated state-year sample, while also offering a denominator that is itself not likely to be significantly impacted by the prevailing malpractice environment (allowing for a focus on the influence of malpractice on the AH count comprising the numerator, our margin of interest).
Primarily, however, based on the same premise as the delivery approach and following Frakes (2012a) , I normalize each state-year AH count by an index of hospitalizations equal to the count of admissions associated with any of the following conditions and events: (1) acute myocardial infarction, (2) stroke, (3) gastro-intestinal bleeding or (4) hip fracture. Such events represent situations characterized by relatively little variation across regions (see, for example, Wennberg 35 See http://www.qualityindicators.ahrq.gov/Downloads/Modules/PQI/PQI%20Summary%20Report.pdf. 36 Those conditions represented in the Weissman et al. (1992) classification include: ruptured appendix, asthma, cellulitis, congestive heart failure, diabetes, gangrene, hypokalemia, immunizable conditions, malignant hypertension, pneumonia, pyelonephritis, and perforated or bleeding ulcer. 37 The NHDS weights are not designed to generate representative state-specific estimates. Of course, observing within-state changes over time in the set of records included in the state-year cells nonetheless affords the ability to identify the intended relationships (Dafny and Gruber 2005) . In any event, though noisier, the results of this exercise generally persist under alternative approaches that either (1) multiply observations by the NHDS sample weights and form AH rates by dividing weighted AH counts by the total population of that state (yet another normalization approach), or (2) forming dependent variables based on the natural log of the state-year AH counts (i.e., under no normalization at all). The primary approaches taken, however, soften some of the sampling variability that occurs within states over time, while normalizing by a measure that is more directly reflective of the scale of the hospital sampled. 1984 and Wennberg and Cooper 1999) , even in the face of environments that impose varying legal and financial incentives (i.e., where such hospitalizations are better seen as proxies for the underlying disease environment, as opposed to reflections of immediate healthcare utilization decisions). As such, this index likewise affords an appropriate scaling of the numerator count with arguably little concern over the malpractice environment impacting the scaling metric.
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In yet another alternative approach, I simply normalize by the count of acute myocardial infarction discharges (primary diagnosis only) for the relevant state and year.
Inpatient Mortality for selected conditions. Following the AHRQ's IQIs, I next construct a quality measure in which I calculate the composite rate of inpatient mortality among a subsample of discharges in which the primary diagnosis code indicates any one of the following conditions: acute myocardial infarction, heart failure, acute stroke, gastrointestinal bleeding, hip fracture or pneumonia. Such events are generally high volume in occurrence, allowing for robust sample sizes. It is worth noting that such conditions, for the most part, also represent lowdiscretionary hospitalizations, whereby inpatient admissions generally follow upon their occurrence.
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With this in mind, mortality rates among this sub-sample of admissions can be seen as more likely reflective of the quality of care observed during the inpatient stay itself, rather than as a result of risk selection by providers or patients.
Of course, a concern arises regarding fluctuations in the proportions of the various conditions comprising this selected-conditions sub-sample. That is, a reduction in the composite mortality rate could arise from a relative increase in the rate of hip fracture admissions (where mortality rates are lower for such admissions relative to the other selected conditions), as opposed to reductions in mortalities that would actually be attributable to improvements in quality. I take two approaches to dealing with this concern. First, in some specifications, I include state-year controls for the proportion of this sub-sample made up of each of the respective conditions. In the primary approach, however, I follow the AHRQ and standardize the composite mortality rate for state-year changes in the various incidences of the conditions.
To risk adjust mortality rates, I employ an indirect standardization approach, in which I first predict the mortality rate that a national sample of patients would be expected to experience if they faced the relevant patient characteristics of each state-year cell. I generate such predictions based on the estimated coefficients from national, annual regressions of mortality incidence on the incidence of the relevant set of conditions. I then calculate the standardized mortality rate by (1) taking the ratio between the observed state-year composite mortality rate and this predicted national mortality rate and (2) multiplying this ratio by the observed national mortality rate.
38 See Frakes (2012a) for empirical support over the contention that the incidences of these low-variation conditions are not sensitive to medical liability standards. Note that higher quality outpatient care may be effective at reducing some amount of hospitalizations for the above-indicated low-variation conditions, though likely to an extent less than quality care may reduce the incidence of the Weissman et al. (1992) avoidable conditions, in which case the proposed avoidable hospitalization rate nonetheless identifies a relative quality measure. 39 For a discussion of the selection of low-discretionary hospitalization categories, see Carter (2003) . Congestive heart failure admissions, however, are arguably more discretionary than the others.
